The Legacy of the Ohrid Framework Agreement

Driving through the region around Tetovo, a predominantly Albanian town in North Macedonia, one is struck by the bilingual street signs—displaying names in both Macedonian and Albanian. Yet, the story these signs tell is more than one of inclusion. In some Albanian-majority towns, the Macedonian names are crossed out; conversely, in Macedonian-majority areas, the Albanian names suffer the same fate. This simple act of defacement underscores a deeper, enduring conflict about language and identity in North Macedonia. Where does this tension stem from? And what does it say about the legacy of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA)?

 

Any discussion of the Yugoslav Wars often finishes with the end of the Kosovo war in 1999. However, in 2001, further armed conflict erupted between the National Liberation Army (NLA), an ethnic Albanian insurgent group, and the Macedonian government in what was then the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The NLA demanded greater rights and recognition for Albanians, including language rights, equitable political representation, and improved access to public services (Marolov, 2012; ESI, 2022). The conflict resulted in approximately 200 deaths and thousands of displaced persons.

While the OFA officially ended the fighting, tensions have flared repeatedly. In 2007, tensions resurfaced when the Macedonian parliament passed a law redrawing municipal boundaries, which affected areas with significant Albanian populations. Protests flared, with language rights again becoming a focal point, as Albanians feared the changes would undermine the use of the Albanian language in official settings.

In May 2015, violent clashes occurred in the town of Kumanovo between Macedonian security forces and an armed group of ethnic Albanians. While the immediate causes were complex, underlying issues included ongoing dissatisfaction with the implementation of the OFA, particularly regarding language rights and equitable representation

In multiethnic states, language becomes both a symbol of and a battleground for equality. In North Macedonia, where Albanians constitute 29% of the population, linguistic inequality has long been a source of contention (State Statistical Office of North Macedonia, 2022). For years, Macedonian—the majority language—dominated all official spheres, relegating Albanian and other minority languages to the margins. The OFA sought to address this imbalance by stipulating that any language spoken by at least 20% of the population would be considered an official language, alongside Macedonian (OFA, 2001).

The 2008 Language Law operationalized the OFA’s provisions, detailing the use of minority languages in various sectors. It allowed the use of minority languages in municipalities where the population met the 20% threshold. However, its implementation faced challenges, and inconsistencies were reported, specifically in judicial proceedings and communication with central authorities (Venice Commission, 2019).

The 2019 language law then mandated bilingualism in official documents, currency, uniforms, and extended the right to use Albanian in all official communications and proceedings. While the law aimed to address previous shortcomings, it faced criticism over its implementation and the capacity of institutions to accommodate the changes (Venice Commission, 2019). These changes were driven not only by internal demands but also by the European Union accession process prioritizing minority rights (Marusic, 2019; ESI, 2022).

Despite these legislative milestones, true linguistic equality remains elusive. The 20% threshold for the recognition of Albanian is insufficient, leaving many communities in linguistic limbo. Moreover, the status of the Albanian language is not enshrined in the constitution, making it vulnerable to political shifts. Recent efforts by certain political factions to challenge the language’s status highlight the need for stronger guarantees (Marusic, 2024).

Without constitutional protection, Albanian could become a victim of political machinations, undermining years of progress. A possible model for the languages of North Macedonia is Kosovo, where both Albanian and Serbian are official state languages, with constitutional backing. Beyond legal reforms, fostering a culture of bilingualism is essential for reconciliation and state-building (Sharevski, 2013). Schools are a critical starting point. Yet, North Macedonia’s education system remains deeply segregated, with Macedonian and Albanian children rarely learning together (Bloodworth, 2020). This separation perpetuates mutual mistrust and hinders the development of a shared identity.

Worse still, the quality of education in Albanian schools is often inferior, exacerbating inequality and driving higher emigration rates among Albanians (Bloodworth, 2020). Bilingual education could bridge these divides, promoting understanding and cooperation from a young age. However, both Macedonian and Albanian communities have resisted such initiatives, fearing cultural assimilation.

Achieving language equality in North Macedonia is not merely a matter of policy; it is a moral imperative for national unity and stability. Political leaders from both sides must prioritize this issue, committing themselves to constitutional reforms and the promotion of bilingualism. International actors, particularly the EU, should continue to press the North Macedonian government to ensure that minority rights remain central to the country’s reform agenda.

The legacy of the OFA is a mixed one. While it brought peace and some progress, the vision of a truly inclusive and equal North Macedonia remains unfulfilled. Language equality is not just about words—it is about dignity, identity, and the future of a nation striving to reconcile its diverse heritage.

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