Efthymis Antonopoulos
Wed 1 April 2026
In 2025, Victim Support Europe’s Policy & Advocacy team continued to regularly monitor case law stemming from the European Court of Human Rights, and to share updates and developments on relevant cases. This document presents a comprehensive summary of judgements, highlighting critical issues such as the protection of victims of sexual abuse, the safeguarding and dignity of migrants, and the upholding of the rights of victims with disabilities.
Court of Justice of the European Union
LD v Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal and Others (C-284/24)
Court of Justice of the European Union, Fifth Chamber Judgment of 2 October 2025
Key issue
Whether a national compensation scheme for victims of violent intentional crime that excludes compensation for pain and suffering complies with Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80/EC, which requires Member States to guarantee fair and appropriate compensation.
Facts
In July 2015, LD was violently assaulted by a group of individuals outside his home in Dublin. He suffered serious physical injuries, including a permanent partial loss of vision, as well as mental distress and anxiety. LD applied for compensation under the Irish Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. While the Tribunal acknowledged that he had suffered personal injury and material loss, it awarded him only reimbursement for expenses directly incurred, excluding any compensation for non-material harm such as pain and suffering. LD challenged this decision before the Irish High Court, arguing that the exclusion of compensation for pain and suffering rendered the Irish scheme incompatible with Directive 2004/80. The High Court referred the question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
Legal framework
Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80 obliges Member States to establish national schemes ensuring “fair and appropriate compensation” to victims of violent intentional crimes. The case also relates to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, in particular Article 3 on the integrity of the person, encompassing both physical and mental integrity.
Findings of the Court
The Court held that although Article 12(2) does not explicitly mention non-material harm, its broad wording does not allow Member States to exclude entire categories of harm from compensation. No distinction may be drawn between material and non-material harm suffered by victims of violent intentional crime.
Interpreting Directive 2004/80 in light of its purpose, structure, and multilingual versions, the Court found no basis for limiting compensation solely to material loss or physical injury. The objective of the directive is to ensure protection of victims and meaningful access to compensation, which necessarily includes, where appropriate, reparation for non-material harm such as pain and suffering.
The Court further emphasised that respect for fundamental rights requires compensation schemes to take into account both physical and mental harm. While Member States retain discretion and are not required to provide full compensation for all damage suffered, “fair and appropriate compensation” must reflect the seriousness of the harm and its consequences for the victim.
Conclusion
The Court ruled that Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80 precludes a national compensation scheme which, as a matter of principle, excludes any compensation for pain and suffering endured by victims of violent intentional crime. Financial considerations or concerns about the sustainability of national schemes cannot justify the complete exclusion of compensation for non-material harm.
Significance
This judgment provides an important clarification on the scope of victims’ rights to compensation under EU law, in particular the meaning of “fair and appropriate compensation” under Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80/EC.
The case arose from a violent assault committed against LD in July 2015 in front of his home in Dublin. LD was attacked by a group of individuals and suffered serious physical injuries, including a permanent partial loss of vision, as well as lasting psychological harm in the form of mental distress and anxiety. He applied for compensation under the Irish Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. While the Tribunal accepted that he had suffered personal injury and material loss, it awarded compensation only for expenses directly incurred, excluding any compensation for non-material harm such as pain and suffering. This exclusion reflected the structure of the Irish scheme, which since a reform in 1986 no longer provides for general damages in respect of non-material harm.
LD challenged that decision before the Irish High Court, arguing that a compensation scheme which excludes pain and suffering is incompatible with Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80, which obliges Member States to establish national schemes guaranteeing fair and appropriate compensation to victims of violent intentional crime. The High Court referred the matter to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
In its judgment, the Court rejected a restrictive interpretation of Article 12(2). Although the provision does not expressly refer to non-material harm, the Court emphasised the breadth of its wording and the absence of any distinction between different categories of damage. Interpreting the directive in light of its objectives, overall scheme, and the need for uniform application across language versions, the Court found no basis for limiting compensation solely to material loss or physical injury. It held that, as a matter of principle, no distinction may be drawn between material and non-material harm suffered by victims of violent intentional crime.
The Court stressed that the objective of Directive 2004/80 is to ensure effective protection of victims and meaningful access to compensation. That objective would be undermined if national schemes were permitted to exclude entire categories of harm by design. The Court further linked this interpretation to the protection of fundamental rights under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, recalling in particular that Article 3 on the right to the integrity of the person encompasses both physical and mental integrity. Compensation schemes established under the directive must therefore, where appropriate, be capable of contributing to the reparation of non-material harm, including pain and suffering.
At the same time, the Court acknowledged that Member States retain a margin of discretion in designing their compensation schemes. They are not required to provide full compensation for all material and non-material damage suffered by victims, and considerations relating to the financial viability of national schemes may be taken into account. However, such considerations cannot justify a system that, as a matter of principle, excludes any compensation for pain and suffering. Fair and appropriate compensation must reflect the seriousness of the harm suffered and its consequences for the victim, taking into account any reparation that may be obtained from the offender under national liability rules.
The Court concluded that Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/80 precludes a national compensation scheme which systematically excludes compensation for non-material harm endured by victims of violent intentional crime. The judgment reinforces a victim-centred interpretation of EU law and confirms that meaningful compensation must address not only financial loss, but also the physical and psychological suffering resulting from serious criminal violence.
European Court of Human Rights
1. CASE OF F.M. AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA
(Applications nos. 71671/16 and 40190/18)-
FINAL
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-238319
Underlying issue
The case concerned the State’s response to severe exploitation and forced labour affecting migrant women in a situation of heightened vulnerability. The underlying issue was not only the prolonged abuse suffered by the applicants, but also the systematic failure of the authorities to recognise them as victims deserving of protection under Article 4 of the Convention. The women’s irregular migration status, gender, and social marginalisation rendered them effectively invisible to the justice system. At its core, the case examined whether State inaction and institutional indifference allowed exploitation to persist and whether the failure to address intersecting vulnerabilities undermined the protection owed to victims of forced labour and exploitation.
Legal matter
The Court examined the case under Article 4 of the Convention, which prohibits slavery, servitude, forced labour and human trafficking, both alone and in conjunction with Article 14. The key legal questions were whether Russia had established an adequate legal and operational framework to prevent forced labour and exploitation and to protect victims in practice, whether the authorities had fulfilled their positive obligation to identify victims and investigate credible allegations of exploitation, and whether the applicants’ intersecting vulnerabilities were properly taken into account. The Court assessed whether the State’s failure to act met the threshold of a breach of its positive obligations under the Convention.
Summary of facts
The applicants were five women from Central Asia who migrated to Moscow in search of work. Lacking regular legal status, they were recruited to work in small shops and subsequently subjected to forced labour, physical and psychological violence, coercion, constant surveillance, and degrading living and working conditions. They worked long hours for little or no pay and were prevented from leaving through threats and intimidation. Despite attempts to seek help and repeated indications of exploitation, the authorities failed to provide protection, carry out meaningful investigations, or assess their situation as that of potential victims of forced labour or exploitation. As a result, the women remained trapped in exploitative conditions for extended periods.
Legal reasoning
The Court found violations of Article 4 of the Convention. It held that Russia had failed to put in place an effective legal and operational framework capable of preventing forced labour and exploitation and of protecting victims in practice. The authorities did not take reasonable steps to identify the applicants as victims, nor did they investigate their complaints with the diligence required in cases involving coercion, exploitation and control. This failure allowed the abusive situation to continue and amounted to a breach of the State’s positive obligations.
In addition, the Court found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 4. It recognised that the authorities’ failure to act was influenced by the applicants’ gender, irregular migration status and social marginalisation, which contributed to their heightened vulnerability and to their lack of access to protection. The Court stressed that victims of forced labour and exploitation must be protected regardless of their nationality or legal residence status and that reliance on a victim’s irregular situation cannot justify State inaction. It further emphasised that exploitation often operates through intersecting vulnerabilities, requiring a victim-centred and gender-sensitive response.
The judgment reinforces the principle that protection from exploitation and equality are closely linked. By acknowledging the role of intersecting vulnerabilities, the Court strengthened the standard requiring States to proactively identify, protect and support victims and to ensure effective investigations in cases involving forced labour and severe exploitation.
Significance
F.M. and Others v. Russia is a significant judgment illustrating how severe exploitation can persist when States fail to put in place meaningful protections for vulnerable victims. It confirms that access to justice for victims of forced labour and exploitation is a core Convention obligation and that failures to recognise vulnerability expose victims to prolonged abuse, impunity and secondary victimisation.
From a victims’ rights perspective, the judgment reinforces that protection must be afforded irrespective of nationality or immigration status and that effective investigations are not optional but an essential component of State responsibility under Article 4. The case also highlights the importance of recognising intersectional victimisation, as the applicants’ gender, migration status, isolation and economic dependence shaped both the abuse they suffered and the authorities’ inadequate response.
Overall, the judgment strengthens European standards on victim protection by reaffirming that States must actively identify victims, respond to credible indications of exploitation and ensure that all victims, egardless of their circumstances, are treated as rights-holders entitled to protection, recognition and access to justice.
2. CASE OF X v. CYPRUS
(Application no. 40733/22)
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-241992
Underlying issue
The case concerned the State’s response to allegations of gang rape and the impact of institutional attitudes on the treatment of sexual-violence survivors. The underlying issue was not only the failure to investigate the alleged rape effectively, but the manner in which the authorities’ conduct contributed to the applicant’s secondary victimisation. The case examined whether coercive questioning practices, reliance on stereotypes, and the failure to pursue the investigation after the applicant’s retraction undermined her dignity, bodily integrity, and access to justice. At its core, the case addressed whether procedural shortcomings and victim-blaming attitudes shielded alleged perpetrators from accountability and deprived the victim of an effective response to sexual violence.
Legal matter
The Court examined the case under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, concerning the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to respect for private life. The key legal questions were whether the authorities fulfilled their positive obligation to conduct a prompt, effective and victim-sensitive investigation into allegations of sexual violence, whether the applicant was protected from secondary victimisation during the criminal process, and whether credibility assessments were carried out in an objective and evidence-based manner. The Court assessed whether Cyprus ensured practical and effective protection of the applicant’s dignity and personal integrity.
Summary of facts
The applicant, a young woman on holiday in Ayia Napa, reported being gang-raped by several men. Shortly after filing her complaint, she was subjected to prolonged questioning, including late-night interrogations, without access to legal assistance or welfare support. Under pressure, she retracted her allegations and was subsequently charged with making a false report. Although the Supreme Court later acquitted her of that charge, the authorities failed to revive or pursue the rape investigation in any meaningful way. Key investigative steps, including the securing of forensic evidence, were either delayed or omitted, and the focus shifted to questioning the applicant’s credibility rather than examining the alleged perpetrators’ conduct.
Legal reasoning
The Court found violations of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. It held that the authorities failed to conduct an effective, timely and victim-sensitive investigation into the allegations of sexual violence. The manner in which the applicant was questioned, combined with the absence of legal or psychological support, exposed her to secondary victimisation and undermined her dignity. The failure to secure and assess crucial evidence further weakened the investigation and deprived it of credibility.
The Court also emphasised that the authorities relied on irrelevant considerations and gender stereotypes when assessing the applicant’s credibility. Instead of focusing on the issue of consent, they drew conclusions from assumptions about her sexual behaviour and lifestyle. The Court stressed that such reasoning is incompatible with Convention standards and perpetuates harmful myths about sexual violence victims.
The judgment reinforces the principle that States have a positive obligation to pursue allegations of sexual violence with diligence and impartiality, regardless of retractions or perceived inconsistencies. It confirms that reliance on discriminatory assumptions and inadequate investigative practices can amount to a violation of the Convention. By identifying victim-blaming attitudes as a source of secondary victimisation, the Court strengthened the European standard requiring trauma-informed, respectful and evidence-based approaches to sexual-violence investigations.
X v. Cyprus is a defining judgment on how institutional attitudes and investigative failures can deepen the trauma of sexual-violence survivors. The applicant, a young woman who reported being gang-raped while on holiday in Ayia Napa, experienced not only the violence itself but also a series of procedural shortcomings that undermined her dignity and access to justice. Shortly after filing her complaint, she was subjected to long, late-night questioning without legal assistance or welfare support. Under pressure, she retracted her allegations and was then charged with making a false report. While the domestic Supreme Court eventually cleared her of that charge, the authorities did not revive the rape investigation in any meaningful way. As a result, the alleged perpetrators were effectively shielded from scrutiny, and the victim was left without a proper examination of her complaint.
The European Court of Human Rights found that Cyprus violated Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. The authorities failed to conduct an effective, timely and victim-sensitive investigation, neglected to secure crucial forensic evidence, and questioned the applicant’s credibility based on irrelevant considerations. The Court highlighted that investigators and prosecutors relied on gender stereotypes and assumptions about the victim’s sexual behaviour and lifestyle, instead of focusing on the central issue of consent. This reasoning amounted to secondary victimisation and showed a disregard for her dignity and rights.
The judgment is important for victims’ rights for several reasons. It reaffirms that States have a positive obligation to investigate allegations of sexual violence promptly and impartially, even in complex or socially sensitive circumstances. A victim’s delayed report, emotional responses or change in account do not absolve authorities of their duty to pursue the truth. The case also emphasises that credibility assessments must not hinge on prejudicial notions of how a “real” victim should behave. When authorities judge a survivor through stereotypes, they risk silencing her and discouraging others from seeking help.
More broadly, the case exposes the gap between formal legal protections and actual practice. Cyprus had legislation in place, but it was the implementation that failed the applicant. This reflects a deeper challenge within many legal systems: that systemic biases, insufficient training and a lack of trauma-informed procedures continue to impede justice for victims of sexual violence. By clearly identifying victim-blaming attitudes as a source of Convention violations, the Court strengthens the European standard on how authorities must treat survivors — with respect, sensitivity and an evidence-based approach.
In essence, X v. Cyprus shows that inadequate investigations and discriminatory assumptions can prolong and intensify victimisation. The ruling calls for institutional reform, better training, and investigative practices that recognise the realities of trauma and the complexity of sexual-violence cases. For policy and advocacy work, it stands as a strong reminder that victims’ rights are not protected by laws alone; they depend on systems that listen, believe and respond without prejudice.
3. CASE OF I.C. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
(Application no. 36436/22)
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-241986
Underlying issue
The case concerned the State’s responsibility to protect a young woman with an intellectual disability who was placed in a private household under Moldova’s deinstitutionalisation policy. Instead of receiving appropriate support and supervision, she was subjected over several years to unpaid forced labour, degrading living conditions and repeated sexual abuse. The underlying issue was whether the State failed to protect her from foreseeable harm, to identify her as a victim of exploitation and sexual violence, and to ensure that she was treated with dignity once she escaped and sought help. The case highlighted the serious risks faced by highly vulnerable individuals placed in community settings without adequate safeguards and supervision, and the systemic nature of victimisation in closed or private environments linked to State-supported care arrangements.
Legal matter
The Court examined the State’s obligations under Articles 3, 4, 8 and 14 of the Convention, focusing on the duty to protect individuals from inhuman and degrading treatment, forced labour and exploitation, interference with private life, and discriminatory treatment. The key legal questions were whether Moldova took reasonable steps to prevent abuse within a State-supported placement, whether the authorities carried out an effective and victim-centred investigation once the allegations emerged, and whether the applicant’s disability and heightened vulnerability were properly taken into account throughout the proceedings. The Court assessed whether the failures of the authorities amounted to breaches of their positive obligations under the Convention.
Summary of facts
The applicant, a young woman with an intellectual disability, had been removed from institutional care and placed with a private family as part of a national deinstitutionalisation programme. Over several years, she lived in degrading conditions, performed hard physical labour without pay and was subjected to repeated sexual abuse by the head of the household. When she eventually escaped, her disclosure was treated with scepticism, and the authorities failed to adapt their investigative approach to her needs and vulnerability. Despite clear indicators of coercion, dependency and psychological control, the domestic courts acquitted the perpetrators, without assessing the evidence in light of the applicant’s disability or the significant power imbalance that defined the situation.
Legal reasoning
The Court held that Moldova violated Article 3 of the Convention by failing to protect the applicant from degrading treatment and by not conducting an investigation capable of establishing the facts or holding those responsible to account. Under Article 4, the Court found that the applicant had been subjected to forced labour and exploitation within a placement organised and overseen by the State, which triggered positive obligations to monitor, prevent abuse and intervene when indicators of exploitation emerged. The authorities’ failure to supervise the placement and to respond adequately allowed the abusive situation to persist.
Under Article 8, the Court concluded that the authorities failed to safeguard the applicant’s physical and psychological integrity and did not ensure that the placement operated with the required level of protection and oversight. Under Article 14, read in conjunction with Articles 3, 4 and 8, the Court found that the authorities failed to take the applicant’s disability into account, resulting in discriminatory effects in the way her testimony was assessed and her case handled. The Court stressed that States must identify victims of exploitation even where they cannot clearly articulate the abuse and that investigations must be adapted to the needs of persons with disabilities to avoid secondary victimisation.
This reasoning reinforced the principle that victim protection, recognition and equality are interdependent elements of the Convention framework.
Significance
I.C. v. the Republic of Moldova is one of the Court’s most important recent judgments on the protection of highly vulnerable victims. It confirms that States remain responsible for the consequences of deinstitutionalisation policies when placements expose individuals to foreseeable harm. The judgment reinforces that victims of exploitation and sexual abuse must be identified and protected even in private or closed settings and that disability-sensitive, victim-centred investigations are not optional but a Convention requirement.
From a victims’ rights perspective, the case underscores that dismissive attitudes, failure to adapt procedures and lack of supervision can amount to secondary victimisation and discriminatory treatment. It provides strong guidance for policymakers and practitioners on the need for safeguards, monitoring and specialised training for professionals working with persons with disabilities, ensuring that protection, dignity and access to justice are guaranteed in practice, not only on paper.
4. L. and Others v. France – 46949/21, 24989/22 and 39759/22
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-14454
Underlying issue
The case addressed how domestic authorities handled allegations of sexual exploitation against a 13-year old girl with severe psychological vulnerability. The core issue was whether the police and courts failed to protect her as a child victim and instead relied on gendered and moralising assumptions that shifted responsibility onto her. Rather than examining the conduct of the perpetrators in light of her age, fragility and inability to give informed consent, the authorities focused on her behaviour and appearance. This approach exposed the child to secondary victimisation and raised concerns about the presence of discriminatory reasoning within judicial processes, directly affecting the level of protection afforded to victims of sexual violence.
Legal matter
The Court examined whether the treatment of the applicant engaged the State’s responsibilities under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and whether the reasoning of the domestic authorities amounted to discrimination under Article 14 taken together with those provisions. The key legal questions were whether the State fulfilled its positive duty to protect a child from sexual violence, whether the investigation and judicial assessment respected her dignity and psychological integrity, and whether gender stereotypes influenced the assessment of consent and credibility. The judgment is significant in that the Court explicitly recognised, in the context of a sexual-violence case, that sexist judicial reasoning can constitute discrimination, confirming that biased language and stereotypical assumptions fall within the scope of Article 14.
Summary of facts
The applicant, L., was 13 years old at the material time and had a documented history of severe psychological difficulties, including repeated suicide attempts and dependence on medication. Over a period of nearly two years, several firefighters had sexual contact with her while being fully aware of her age and vulnerability. Expert reports confirmed that her mental condition prevented her from giving informed consent. Nevertheless, the investigation and subsequent proceedings focused on her behaviour rather than her vulnerability. A police officer criticised her for not resisting “as a woman being raped would,” and the courts described her as “provocative” and “unbridled,” even referring to her “morphology” to imply consent. The proceedings lasted almost twelve years, during which this language and approach contributed to further deterioration of her mental health.
Legal reasoning
The Court held that France violated Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. It found that the authorities failed to conduct a contextual assessment of consent that took into account the applicant’s age, medical condition and extreme vulnerability, and that the manner in which the proceedings were conducted exposed her to secondary victimisation. The Court considered that the remarks made by the police officer and the moralising descriptions used by the courts amounted to degrading treatment and showed a disregard for the applicant’s dignity.
The Court also found a violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8. It concluded that the domestic authorities’ reasoning relied on gendered stereotypes about how a female victim should behave and assessed the applicant’s credibility through moral judgement rather than evidence. This discriminatory approach diminished the seriousness of the acts, affected the assessment of consent and aggravated the harm suffered by the applicant. The Court stressed that such reasoning is incompatible with the Convention and cannot be accepted in the handling of sexual-violence cases, particularly where child victims are concerned.
Significance
L. and Others v. France is a landmark judgment on the treatment of victims of sexual violence, especially children, within the justice system. It confirms that secondary victimisation caused by sexist and moralising judicial reasoning can itself constitute a violation of the Convention and amount to discrimination. By explicitly linking victim-blaming language to Article 14, the Court strengthened the protection afforded to survivors and elevated sexual-violence jurisprudence to the level previously developed in domestic violence cases.
From a victims’ rights perspective, the judgment underscores that child victims must be protected through contextual, trauma-informed and non-discriminatory assessments of consent. It sends a clear message that stereotypes, moral judgement and credibility assessments based on appearance or behaviour undermine justice and perpetuate harm. The case provides a strong foundation for reforms aimed at ensuring that investigations and judicial decisions respect the dignity, equality and rights of survivors, particularly those who are young and highly vulnerable.
5. AFFAIRE E.A. ET ASSOCIATION EUROPÉENNE
CONTRE LES VIOLENCES FAITES AUX FEMMES AU TRAVAIL c. FRANCE
(Requête no 30556/22)
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-244682
Underlying issue
The case concerned the State’s responsibility to protect an employee who suffered sustained sexual violence, coercive control and degrading treatment by her supervisor within a hospital workplace. The underlying issue was whether the French authorities provided adequate legal and procedural safeguards to address non-consensual sexual acts committed in a context of authority and psychological manipulation. The case exposed shortcomings in recognising coercion within professional hierarchies, assessing consent in situations where power imbalances undermine autonomy, and ensuring that victims of workplace sexual violence are not subjected to investigative practices that contribute to secondary victimisation.
Legal matter
The Court examined whether France fulfilled its obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. The key legal questions concerned whether the State ensured a criminal-law framework and investigative practice capable of addressing non-consensual acts rooted in coercive control rather than overt physical force, and whether the investigation and judicial assessment respected the victim’s dignity and protected her from degrading treatment. The Court assessed whether shortcomings in the legal framework and in its application deprived the applicant of practical and effective protection against sexual violence in the workplace.
Summary of facts
The applicant was a hospital pharmacy technician who experienced serious psychological coercion and sexual violence from her supervisor, a chief pharmacist who used his position of authority to manipulate, isolate and control her. Over time, the relationship became characterised by domination, pressure and degrading acts that exploited her emotional and professional dependence. When she sought protection, the authorities relied on narrow interpretations of violence and constraint, failing to assess the coercive environment created by the perpetrator. The investigation and judicial reasoning repeatedly overlooked evidence of control dynamics, focused on formalistic interpretations of consent and ultimately failed to recognise the applicant as a victim of sexual violence within a workplace hierarchy.
Legal reasoning
The Court held that France violated Article 3 of the Convention because the domestic authorities failed to protect the applicant from degrading treatment, both through shortcomings in the legal framework and through procedural handling that did not reflect the realities of coercive control and psychological pressure. It found a violation of Article 8 because the State did not ensure a legal and investigative approach capable of safeguarding the applicant’s physical and psychological integrity in the workplace.
The Court emphasised that in cases of sexual violence occurring within relationships of authority, consent cannot be meaningfully assessed without examining the broader context, including dependency, coercive dynamics and the victim’s vulnerability. It criticised the authorities for failing to investigate the full scope of the allegations, for not adequately preserving and assessing relevant evidence, and for relying on reasoning that disregarded the power imbalance at play. The Court further noted that elements of the authorities’ approach reflected gendered assumptions, reinforcing the need for investigative and judicial frameworks free from stereotypes. By recognising that the State’s response caused secondary victimisation and failed to ensure effective protection, the Court confirmed violations of Articles 3 and 8.
Significance
E.A. and Association Européenne contre les violences faites aux femmes au travail v. France is a significant judgment on the protection of victims of sexual violence and coercive control in professional settings. It clarifies that psychological coercion and abuse of authority can amount to degrading treatment and require a contextual assessment of consent under the Convention. The judgment underscores that investigative shortcomings and formalistic reasoning can themselves violate victims’ rights by undermining dignity and personal integrity.
From a victims’ rights perspective, the ruling highlights the need for trauma-informed investigations, early preservation of evidence and judicial approaches that recognise power dynamics and vulnerability in workplace relationships. It contributes to the Court’s evolving case law on sexual violence by strengthening the obligation on States to ensure practical and effective protection against abuse occurring in contexts of
authority, and by reinforcing the importance of victim-centred approaches free from stereotypes and secondary victimisation.
6. CASE OF SCUDERONI V. ITALY
(application no. 6045/24)
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-244853
Underlying issue
The case concerned the State’s response to a woman who suffered repeated domestic violence, including intimidation, threats, psychological abuse, surveillance and physical assault carried out by her former partner. The underlying issue was whether Italy fulfilled its duty to protect the applicant and her child once the authorities were informed of an escalating pattern of harm. The case exposed serious shortcomings in the civil and criminal justice responses, where delayed proceedings, fragmented procedures and a tendency to minimise domestic abuse resulted in prolonged exposure to risk. At its core, the case examined whether the authorities understood domestic violence as a pattern of coercive control and whether their failure to intervene amounted to a breach of the State’s positive obligations.
Legal matter
The Court examined whether Italy complied with its obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. The legal questions focused on whether the authorities took timely and effective preventive measures, whether they conducted proper and structured risk assessments, whether the investigation was carried out with the special diligence required in domestic violence cases, and whether the handling of the applicant’s complaints respected her right to physical and psychological integrity. The Court assessed whether institutional passivity, delay and trivialisation of violence amounted to a failure to protect the applicant from foreseeable harm.
Summary of facts
The applicant endured months of harassment, intimidation and physical abuse while living with her former partner. She reported incidents on multiple occasions and submitted supporting material, including medical reports and evidence of surveillance and threats. Despite this, the civil courts scheduled a hearing on her urgent protection request nine months after submission and dismissed her application without carrying out a risk assessment. At the criminal level, the registration of her complaint took two months, despite clear signs of ongoing harm. Subsequent proceedings examined each incident in isolation rather than as part of a broader pattern of coercive behaviour. The courts ultimately acquitted the perpetrator by characterising the violence as ordinary conflict following the end of a relationship. Throughout this period, the applicant and her child remained without effective protection.
Legal reasoning
The Court held that Italy violated Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention because the authorities failed to take the applicant’s situation seriously and did not provide prompt or effective protection. The lack of timely hearings, the absence of structured risk assessments and the delays in registering and investigating the criminal complaint demonstrated a failure to act with the urgency required in domestic violence cases.
The Court emphasised that domestic abuse must be understood as a pattern of coercive control and cannot be assessed through isolated incidents or narrow interpretations of ill-treatment. By minimising the applicant’s experiences and failing to recognise the cumulative psychological and physical harm, the authorities exposed her and her child to continued risk and undermined her right to respect for private life and physical integrity. The judgment confirmed that States must respond proactively to domestic violence, ensure that courts and investigators are capable of identifying patterns of coercion, and avoid reasoning that trivialises harm or shifts responsibility onto the victim.
Significance
Scuderoni v. Italy reinforces the Court’s established case law on domestic violence and the duty of States to act with urgency and diligence when victims report abuse. It confirms that delayed proceedings, lack of risk assessment and fragmented responses can amount to violations of Articles 3 and 8 where they leave victims exposed to foreseeable harm.
From a victims’ rights perspective, the judgment underscores that effective protection must be immediate, coordinated and grounded in an understanding of coercive control. It highlights the particular responsibility of civil and criminal courts to recognise patterns of abuse, take children’s safety into account and avoid trivialising violence as private conflict. The case stands as a reminder that preventing domestic violence requires not only legal frameworks, but also institutional practices that respond swiftly, coherently and with respect for the dignity and rights of those seeking protection.
7. CASE OF N.T. v. CYPRUS
(Application no. 28150/22)
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/?i=001-243885
Underlying issue
The case concerned the State’s response to allegations of rape and the impact of gender stereotypes on the investigation and prosecution of sexual violence. The underlying issue was not only the sexual assault reported by the applicant, but also the manner in which the authorities assessed her credibility and discontinued the proceedings on the basis of stereotypical assumptions rather than an objective evaluation of consent. At its core, the case examined whether reliance on gendered myths about victim behaviour, emotions and relationships undermined the protection owed to survivors of sexual violence and deprived them of effective access to justice.
Legal matter
The Court examined the case under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, concerning the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to respect for private life, read in conjunction with Article 14. The key legal questions were whether the authorities conducted an effective and victim-centred investigation into the allegations of rape, whether the applicant was afforded meaningful procedural rights within the criminal process, and whether prosecutorial decision-making was influenced by discriminatory gender stereotypes. The Court assessed whether Cyprus fulfilled its positive obligations to protect the applicant’s dignity, bodily integrity and right to an effective response to sexual violence.
Summary of facts
The applicant reported being raped as a teenager and cooperated with the authorities during the investigation. The police gathered statements and evidence, and the case was referred for prosecution. The proceedings were later discontinued following an assessment that focused on the applicant’s behaviour, emotional reactions and prior relationship with the accused, rather than on an objective analysis of consent. Throughout the process, the applicant was denied access to the case file, was insufficiently informed about key procedural decisions and was treated as a passive participant rather than as a rights holder. These shortcomings compounded the harm she had already suffered.
Legal reasoning
The Court found violations of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. It held that the authorities failed to conduct an effective, trauma-informed investigation and did not adequately take into account the specific dynamics of sexual violence, including delayed disclosure, ambivalence and the psychological impact of trauma. The applicant was excluded from meaningful participation in the proceedings, and the lack of transparency and communication contributed to secondary victimisation, undermining her dignity and personal integrity.
The Court also found a violation of Article 14, read in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8. It concluded that the decision to discontinue the prosecution was influenced by discriminatory gender stereotypes that placed an unfair burden on the applicant. Instead of assessing the conduct of the alleged perpetrator and the presence or absence of consent, the authorities relied on assumptions about how a “real” victim should behave, feel or react. The Court stressed that such reasoning is incompatible with the Convention and cannot justify decisions taken in the context of sexual-violence investigations.
The judgment reinforces the principle that protection from sexual violence and equality are inseparable. By explicitly identifying the role of gender stereotypes, the Court clarified that discriminatory assumptions in criminal justice processes undermine victims’ access to justice and perpetuate impunity.
Significance
N.T. v. Cyprus is a significant judgment for victims’ rights, particularly in the context of sexual violence and the persistent influence of gender stereotypes in criminal justice systems. It confirms that survivors of sexual violence are entitled to respectful treatment, evidence-based credibility assessments and meaningful procedural rights, regardless of when or how they disclose the abuse.
The judgment also exposes how institutional attitudes can reinforce victimisation. By condemning stereotype-based reasoning and procedural exclusion, the Court strengthened European standards on trauma-informed investigations and non-discriminatory prosecutorial decision-making. For policy and advocacy work, the case provides a clear foundation for calling for training, safeguards and reforms to ensure that justice systems protect the dignity and rights of survivors, rather than reproducing harm through bias and disbelief.
Underlying issue
The case concerned the use of a covert online operation in which an undercover police officer posed as a twelve-year-old girl in a public chatroom. The central issue was whether the investigative method and the reliance on the resulting communications respected the guarantees of a fair trial. The Court examined whether the authorities crossed the line into entrapment or whether the operation was a legitimate tool to detect adults seeking sexual contact with minors online, balancing child protection with safeguards against unfair State inducement.
Legal matter
The Court examined the case under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial). The key questions were whether the undercover operation had an adequate factual basis and legal framework limiting the risk of entrapment, and whether the domestic courts carried out a proper assessment of the entrapment complaint and the fairness of using the obtained material in evidence.
Summary of facts
The applicant engaged in sexually explicit online conversations with a person he believed to be a twelve-year-old girl. In reality, the account belonged to an undercover police officer acting within an authorised operation aimed at detecting sexual approaches to minors in online chat environments. The applicant argued in the domestic proceedings and before the Court that he had been entrapped and that the evidence should not have been used. The national courts rejected this argument and convicted him on the basis of the chats.
Legal reasoning
The Court found no violation of Article 6 § 1. It accepted that the police had objective reasons to deploy covert methods in an online space believed to pose risks to minors. It also found that the operation remained within permissible limits: the undercover officer did not exert pressure or incite offending, while the domestic courts concluded that the applicant himself initiated and pursued the sexualised exchange. The Court further noted that the domestic courts addressed the entrapment complaint and that the applicant had a real opportunity to challenge both the method and the evidence, so the overall fairness of the proceedings was preserved.
Significance
Helme v. Estonia confirms that carefully bounded undercover techniques can be compatible with Article 6 when used to prevent sexual harm to children in online settings, provided they are grounded in objective reasons, conducted under safeguards against entrapment, and subject to effective judicial scrutiny. For child-protection policy, it supports proactive investigations in digital environments while insisting that convictions must not be based on State-induced offending and must be tested through fair-trial guarantees.
9. CASE OF BEDNAREK AND OTHERS v. POLAND
(Application no. 58207/14)
Underlying issue
The case concerned the State’s response to violent attacks accompanied by homophobic hostility and the failure of the authorities to recognise and address the discriminatory motive behind the violence. The underlying issue was not whether physical assaults occurred, which was undisputed, but whether the State fulfilled its obligation to ensure that violence motivated by prejudice based on sexual orientation was properly identified, investigated and sanctioned. At its core, the case examined whether treating homophobic attacks as ordinary acts of violence deprived the applicants of effective protection and equal treatment under the Convention.
Legal matter
The Court examined the case under Article 3 of the Convention, both alone and in conjunction with Article 14. The key legal questions were whether the violence suffered by the applicants reached the threshold of severity required by Article 3, and whether the authorities discharged their positive obligation to investigate and respond to the discriminatory dimension of the attacks. The Court assessed whether the failure to classify and prosecute the violence as hate-motivated amounted to discriminatory treatment contrary to Article 14.
Summary of facts
The applicants were several individuals who were subjected to physical violence accompanied by homophobic insults and expressions of hostility linked to their actual or perceived sexual orientation. The assaults caused both physical injuries and psychological distress. The authorities investigated the incidents and ultimately convicted the perpetrators for battery. However, despite clear indications that prejudice based on sexual orientation had played a role in at least two of the attacks, the domestic authorities did not treat the offences as hate-motivated. The homophobic context was not reflected in the legal qualification of the offences or in the determination of the penalties imposed.
Legal reasoning
The Court found that the treatment suffered by the applicants reached the threshold of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3. It held that, while the authorities had taken some investigative steps and secured convictions for ordinary battery, this response was insufficient in light of the discriminatory nature of the violence.
The Court emphasised that where there are prima facie indications that violent acts were motivated by prejudice, the authorities have a duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask and address that motive. In the present case, homophobic slurs and expressions of hostility were documented, yet they were not meaningfully examined or reflected in the criminal proceedings. A central issue identified by the Court was the absence, at the material time, of an adequate domestic legal framework in Poland capable of addressing hate crimes based on sexual orientation. Polish criminal law did not explicitly include sexual orientation among the protected grounds for hate-motivated offences, which limited the authorities’ ability to prosecute and punish the discriminatory aspect of the attacks
The Court concluded that Poland had violated Article 3 in conjunction with Article 14, as it failed to ensure that violence motivated by hostility towards the applicants’ sexual orientation did not remain without an appropriate and proportionate response.
Significance
Bednarek and Others v. Poland is a key judgment on homophobic violence and the intersection between protection from ill-treatment and non-discrimination. It confirms that States’ obligations do not end with investigating and punishing physical violence as such. Where attacks are driven by prejudice, authorities must actively identify, acknowledge and address the discriminatory motive.
From a victims’ rights perspective, the judgment underscores that recognition of bias is an essential component of justice. Treating hate-motivated violence as ordinary crime ignores the broader harm inflicted on both the victims and the communities they belong to, and risks reinforcing stigma and impunity. The case highlights the importance of comprehensive hate-crime legislation, specialised training for law-enforcement and prosecutors, and sentencing practices that reflect the gravity of bias-motivated violence. It reinforces the principle that equality and protection from inhuman or degrading treatment are inseparable under the Convention.
10. CASE OF A.J. AND L.E. v. SPAIN
(Applications nos. 40312/23 and 40388/23)
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-245390
Underlying issue
The case concerned the failure of the Spanish authorities to conduct an effective investigation into allegations of sexual assault involving chemical submission. The underlying issue was not the determination of the suspects’ criminal responsibility, but whether the State complied with its procedural obligations to investigate credible allegations of serious sexual violence. At the heart of the case were systemic investigative failures, including the loss, destruction and manipulation of potentially decisive evidence while in police custody, insufficient guarantees of independence and an inadequate institutional response once those failures came to light. The case examined whether these shortcomings deprived the applicants of practical and effective protection of their physical and psychological integrity.
Legal matter
The Court examined the case under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, under their procedural limb. The key legal questions were whether the authorities conducted a prompt, thorough, independent and effective investigation into the applicants’ allegations of sexual assault, whether crucial evidence was properly secured and preserved, and whether investigative shortcomings were adequately remedied once identified. The Court assessed whether the cumulative effect of evidence loss, lack of independence and delayed reactions amounted to a breach of the State’s positive obligations.
Summary of facts
The applicants alleged that they had been sexually assaulted following chemical submission after a night out in Pamplona. They reported having no memory of events between drinking at a bar with two men and waking up the following morning undressed, with physical sensations consistent with sexual intercourse. One applicant sought medical assistance, triggering the protocol for suspected sexual assault involving chemical submission and notification to the police.
The police investigation initially progressed, with the arrest and questioning of the suspects, who admitted to sexual intercourse but claimed it was consensual. However, during the investigation, several pieces of potentially crucial evidence disappeared or were compromised while in police custody. These included the full forensic report of one suspect’s mobile telephone, partially missing and altered video surveillance footage from the bar, and the complete erasure of a hard drive containing extracted forensic data, despite a judicial preservation order being in force.
Further concerns arose from the fact that one suspect was the brother-in-law of a police officer assigned to the investigative unit. Although multiple separate investigations were later opened into the loss and manipulation of evidence, they were initiated several years after the events and did not result in accountability. The criminal proceedings concerning the alleged sexual assault were ultimately discontinued due to insufficient evidence.
Legal reasoning
The Court held that Spain had violated Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention under their procedural limb. It accepted that Spain had an adequate legal framework for addressing sexual offences, including those involving chemical submission, and that the authorities initially reacted promptly to the applicants’ allegations. However, the effectiveness of the investigation was fundamentally undermined by serious and cumulative failures in evidence preservation and handling.
The Court emphasised that cases involving alleged chemical submission present particular investigative challenges, making the swift securing and preservation of digital, video and forensic evidence especially crucial. The disappearance of the mobile-phone forensic report, the partial loss of video footage and the erasure of the hard drive containing extracted data removed several obvious and potentially decisive lines of inquiry. These failures were not counter-balanced by other investigative measures, which proved insufficient to compensate for the evidentiary gaps created. The Court also found that the investigation lacked sufficient guarantees of independence. The presence of a close family relationship between one suspect and a police officer involved in the investigation compromised the appearance and reality of independence, particularly in a case where evidence was lost while under police control. The authorities’ response to the evidence loss was further criticised as manifestly inadequate, marked by delayed disclosure, delayed investigations into possible misconduct and the involvement of the same institutional actors who had overseen the flawed investigation.
Taken cumulatively, these shortcomings went beyond isolated errors and rendered the investigation incapable of establishing the relevant facts or ensuring accountability. The Court concluded that the applicants were deprived of the procedural protection required by Articles 3 and 8 in respect of their allegations of sexual assault.
Significance
A.J. and L.E. v. Spain is a key procedural judgment on States’ obligations to investigate sexual violence effectively, particularly in cases involving chemical submission. It reinforces that the preservation of evidence, investigative independence and prompt, transparent responses to irregularities are central components of effective investigations under Articles 3 and 8.
From a victims’ rights perspective, the judgment underlines that investigative failures, especially the loss or destruction of evidence in official custody, can themselves constitute Convention violations, regardless of whether the perpetrators’ criminal responsibility is ultimately established. It also highlights the heightened diligence required in cases where evidentiary challenges are inherent and where conflicts of interest may arise within investigative bodies. The case strengthens European standards on procedural protection and accountability in the investigation of serious sexual violence.
11. CASE OF STEPHAN KUCERA v. AUSTRIA
(Application no. 13810/22)
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-247650
Underlying issue
The case concerned the compatibility of fully remote judicial hearings with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. The underlying issue was not the use of videoconferencing technology as such, but whether conducting an oral hearing exclusively by videolink undermined essential procedural guarantees, including immediacy, publicity and effective participation. At its core, the case examined whether exceptional public-health circumstances could justify procedural adaptations without weakening access to justice or impairing the parties’ ability to engage meaningfully in judicial proceedings.
Legal matter
The Court examined the case primarily under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, concerning the right to a fair, public and oral hearing. It also assessed, as part of the overall fairness analysis, whether the arrangements affected the applicant’s right to effective legal assistance under Article 6 § 3(c). The key legal questions were whether participation via videoconference satisfied the requirement of an oral hearing, whether the public character of the proceedings was preserved despite physical restrictions, and whether the technical and organisational arrangements interfered with effective defence rights or confidential lawyer-client communication.
Summary of facts
The applicant was fined in administrative criminal proceedings for breaches of Austrian betting legislation and requested a public oral hearing on appeal. Due to legislative measures adopted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Vienna Regional Administrative Court conducted the hearing entirely by videoconference, with the judge physically present in the courtroom and all other participants joining remotely. During the hearing, the applicant’s lawyer objected to the format, raising concerns about publicity and equality of arms. Minor technical issues occurred but were resolved without disrupting the proceedings. The domestic courts dismissed the applicant’s subsequent challenges, leading him to lodge an application with the European Court of Human Rights.
Legal reasoning
The Court found no violation of Article 6 of the Convention. It reiterated that physical presence in a courtroom is an important procedural safeguard, but not an absolute requirement. What matters is whether the proceedings, viewed as a whole, were fair and enabled effective participation. The Court placed particular emphasis on the exceptional context of the COVID-19 pandemic, noting that the videoconference hearing had a clear legal basis, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public health, and was accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards.
The Court found that the applicant and his lawyer were able to participate effectively, present arguments and engage with the court. The minor technical disruptions did not impair the fairness of the hearing. As regards publicity, the Court held that alternative arrangements may satisfy the requirement of a public hearing when physical attendance is restricted, provided that transparency is ensured and public access is not rendered illusory. It was satisfied that the essence of the publicity principle had been preserved in the circumstances.
Concerning legal assistance, the Court found no interference with the applicant’s right to communicate confidentially with his lawyer. The defence retained control over the organisation of participation and communication, and no restrictions were imposed by the authorities that would undermine the effectiveness of legal representation.
Significance
Kučera v. Austria is an important judgment on access to justice and procedural flexibility in times of crisis. It confirms that fully remote hearings may be compatible with Article 6 where they are exceptional, justified by legitimate aims, based on clear legal frameworks and accompanied by safeguards ensuring effective participation, equality of arms and transparency.
From a broader access-to-justice perspective, the judgment clarifies that fair-trial guarantees are not dependent on rigid procedural formalism, but on a functional assessment of whether proceedings are fair in substance. At the same time, the Court’s reasoning implicitly cautions against normalising emergency measures. Remote hearings are permissible under the Convention only insofar as they do not erode the core guarantees of fairness, publicity and effective defence. The case therefore serves as a benchmark for assessing future digital-justice reforms in light of Convention standards.
